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UNDESERVING HEIRS?-THE CASE OF THE
"TERMINATED" PARENT
Richard Lewis Brown *
I. INTRODUCTION
Every state has an intestate succession statute that prescribes
how the property of those who die without a will should be dis-
tributed.1 Every state also by statute authorizes the government
to intervene in the parent-child relationship in the most draco-
nian manner possible by involuntarily terminating parental
rights.2 This article explores how the law functions at the inter-
section of these two statutory schemes-the inheritance regime,
as expressed through intestate succession statutes, and the child
welfare regime, as expressed through termination of parental
rights statutes ("TPR statutes").
These two legal regimes could not be more different in the role
they ascribe to individual worthiness. The inheritance scheme
historically has been blind to the worthiness of individual heirs.
The child welfare scheme, in contrast, gives great weight to the
individual worthiness-or, more accurately, unworthiness-of
parents. The interaction of these two schemes inevitably raises an
important, broader issue-whether, and how, the behavior of in-
dividual potential heirs ought to affect inheritance rights.3 Should
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas.
B.A., 1967, University of California Los Angeles; J.D., 1975, Indiana University; M.L.L.,
1978, University of Washington. I would like to express my appreciation to Ann McGinley
and Lynnda Brown for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 46 (3d ed. 2004).
2. See 1 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4.04(1)(a)
(Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2004). For a listing of state termination of parental rights
statutes, see Tracy B. Harding, Note, Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: Reform
Is Needed, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 895, 896 n.l1 (2001).
3. The possibility and advisability of a more expansive role for assessments of indi-
vidual behavior, and thus worthiness, of heirs have been explored by several commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The
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the individualized unworthiness of a potential heir extinguish her
inheritance rights? And if so, how should we determine which
heirs are, in fact, sufficiently undeserving to warrant extinguish-
ing their inheritance rights?
Intestate succession statutes are, by their very nature, formu-
laic. They determine who will inherit by applying a purely me-
chanical formula. Heirs inherit not because of their individual
worthiness, but rather (and only) because they stand in a particu-
lar biological or marital relationship with the decedent.4 While
there is considerable variation among state intestate succession
statutes, the right of an heir (other than the surviving spouse)5 to
inherit is almost always based on a parent-child relationship or a
chain of parent-child relationships between the decedent and the
heir. After the surviving spouse's share is determined, surviving
issue (children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc.) gener-
ally inherit the remainder of the estate.6 If there are no surviving
issue, the remainder of the estate generally passes to the dece-
dent's parents, or, if there are no surviving parents, to other an-
cestors, such as grandparents or great-grandparents, or collateral
relatives, such as siblings, nieces and nephews, or cousins.7 The
fact that a child was estranged, or a spouse unloving, or a parent
insufferable, is of no consequence in determining inheritance
rights. With very few exceptions,' the personal characteristics of
the heir are simply irrelevant to the heir's right to inherit. Like
the meek, the undeserving can, and often do, inherit the earth.
Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77 (1998); Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat
Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 277 (1994);
Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We
Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REV. 517 (1994).
4. In this respect, the intestate succession scheme stands in stark contrast to the law
of wills. The primary function of a will is to effectuate the individualized intention of the
testator, which can, and often does, reflect the testator's view of the worthiness or deserv-
ingness of individual devisees.
5. The share of the estate received by the surviving spouse may depend on the size of
the estate, whether the decedent also left surviving children, how many children survived
the decedent, and whether all of the decedent's surviving children are also children of the
surviving spouse and, conversely, whether all of the surviving spouse's children are also
children of the decedent. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, 62-
64 (7th ed. 2005); MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 1, at 48-50.
6. See DUKEMINIER ET AL. supra note 5, at 73; MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 1, at
50-54.
7. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 78.
8. See infra Sections III.A-B.
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In contrast, termination of parental rights is very much tied to
an assessment of the personal characteristics of the parent. Pa-
rental rights can be terminated only upon a showing that the
parent is unfit.9 Because, as the Supreme Court of the United
States has recognized, "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their
child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State,"1° parental unfitness must be established by at least clear
and convincing evidence. 1 The grounds for termination are gen-
erally specified in each state's termination of parental rights
statute. Physical or sexual abuse of the child, unsurprisingly, al-
most always constitutes grounds for termination. But state ter-
mination of parental rights statutes often include a variety of
other parental failures as well, including neglect, abandonment,
nonsupport, mental illness, substance abuse, and incarceration. 2
One obvious consequence of a termination of parental rights is to
free the child for adoption. 3 A termination decree, however, has
effects beyond making the child adoptable. As we will see, the
termination of parental rights is likely also to affect inheritance
rights.
How, then, should the law function at the intersection of these
two very different statutory schemes-intestate succession and
termination of parental rights? What is, and more importantly,
what should be, the effect of a termination of parental rights or-
der on the right of the terminated parent to inherit from the
child? 4 Should termination of parental rights automatically dis-
qualify a terminated biological parent from inheriting? If so, why?
Do we believe that all terminated parents are, by definition, "bad"
parents and thus unworthy of inheriting from their children? Do
9. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.04(1)(a).
10. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
11. Id. at 769.
12. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.04(1)(a)(i)-(vii).
13. Termination of parental rights, however, may well not be followed by adoption,
leaving the child as a legal orphan. See generally Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Re-
cent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-
An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995).
14. I have explored the closely connected issue of the effect of termination of parental
rights on the right of the child to inherit from the terminated parent elsewhere. See Rich-
ard L. Brown, Disinheriting the "Legal Orphan": Inheritance Rights of Children After Ter-
mination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125 (2005).
2006]
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we have reason to believe that disinheritance of the parent best
reflects the intent of the child? And if termination of parental
rights does extinguish the right of the parent to inherit from the
child, should we similarly disqualify other relatives who are re-
lated to the decedent through the terminated parent?
State TPR statutes treat the inheritance rights of terminated
parents in a variety of ways. In some states, the termination
statutes explicitly preserve the right of the terminated parent to
inherit. 15 In contrast, other state statutes explicitly extinguish
the right of terminated parents to inherit.16 Yet other statutes fail
to expressly address the inheritance rights of parents at all. 17
Part II of this article outlines and discusses the range of state
statutory approaches to parental inheritance after termination of
parental rights.
Although the worthiness of individual heirs is generally irrele-
vant to the operation of the intestate succession scheme, 8 there
are, in fact, a small number of significant exceptions to that gen-
eral rule. This article looks first to these exceptions to determine
what they might tell us about whether termination of parental
rights ought to affect the inheritance rights of the terminated
parent. The most notable such exception is the slayer rule, which
precludes an heir from inheriting from a decedent who was mur-
dered by the heir. 9 Section III.A considers whether the rationales
that underlie the slayer rule can be extended to justify the disin-
heritance of terminated parents. In a few jurisdictions, other
categories of potential heirs as well are disinherited because of
their individual malfeasance. In a small number of states, for in-
stance, spouses who commit adultery or abandon their spouse
cannot inherit from that spouse. 20 Similarly, in some states, par-
ents who abandon or fail to support a child may be barred by
statute from inheriting from that child. 2' These statutes are ex-
15. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
19. See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 803, 844-56 (1993) (providing an overview of American slayer statutes).
20. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-436(g) (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
392.090(2) (LexisNexis 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. EST.
PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a) (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 2005); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2106(a) (West Supp. 2005).
21. For a detailed discussion on states' positions on this issue, see Monopoli, supra
[Vol. 40:447
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plored in Section III.B. In the sections that follow, we consider
whether the approach taken in these statutes should extend to
the disinheritance of terminated parents.
Part IV moves to a more direct assessment of whether the
automatic disinheritance of terminated parents is supported by
any persuasive policy rationale. Section IV.A considers whether
the disinheritance of terminated parents is justified by any bene-
fit to the child and concludes that the disinheritance of the termi-
nated parent does not benefit the child. Section IV.B analyzes
whether the disinheritance of terminated parents might be justi-
fied as a means of redirecting the child's estate to more deserving
caregivers. While this rationale might justify disinheriting some
terminated parents, it does not constitute an adequate rationale
to support the automatic disinheritance of all terminated parents
that is effectuated by many TPR statutes.
Section IV.C explores the rationale for disinheriting terminated
parents that seems, on the surface, to be the most compelling-
the notion that parents whose parental rights have been termi-
nated must be "bad" parents who do not deserve to receive any
benefit, such as inheritance rights, from their children. Despite
the initial appeal of this rationale, however, the disinheritance of
terminated parents is difficult to justify as an appropriate means
of punishing "bad" parents. The disinheritance provisions of ter-
mination statutes are poorly tailored for that purpose, being both
seriously over-inclusive and under-inclusive in their effect. They
are over-inclusive in that they terminate, and thus disinherit par-
ents who may be "bad" parents in the sense that they are unable
to parent adequately, but who are not "bad" in the sense of being
morally culpable-as, for instance, parents who have been
deemed inadequate because of mental illness or mental retarda-
tion or who have been subjected themselves to the domestic abuse
in the home that underlies the termination. Similarly, the pun-
ishment of "bad" parents through disinheritance may be seriously
under-inclusive. The child welfare system in general, including
termination of parental rights proceedings, does not affect all
parents equally. Rather, the system disproportionately affects
parents who are women, parents who are poor, and parents who
are racial minorities.22 Thus, the punishment by disinheritance
note 3, at 265-73, and Rhodes, supra note 3, at 532-41.
22. See generally Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gen-
20061
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affects primarily a racially and economically disadvantaged seg-
ment of the universe of parents.
Part V discusses whether disinheritance of terminated parents
should also act to preclude inheritance by kin of the terminated
parent. Finally, Part VI proposes an alternative to the current
statutory approaches to parental inheritance rights after termi-
nation, suggesting that state termination of parental rights stat-
utes be amended to provide for discretionary, rather than manda-
tory, extinguishing of the inheritance rights of terminated
parents.
II. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES AND
INHERITANCE RIGHTS-THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
As we are concerned with the effect of a termination of parental
rights on the right of the terminated parent to inherit from the
child, it seems sensible to look first at the language of the stat-
utes themselves. We will see that the state statutes provide a va-
riety of answers to our question and that many statutes provide
no explicit answer at all.
Some statutes explicitly preserve the right of the terminated
parent to inherit. 23 These statutes, which I will call Type A stat-
utes, generally provide that the termination order divests both
parent and child of all legal rights and obligations, except that the
rights of both the parent and the child to inherit are not termi-
nated. 24 Type A statutes are relatively rare.
More commonly, termination statutes explicitly extinguish the
rights of the terminated parent to inherit. These statutes I will
der, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577 (1997).
23. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-63 (1993 & Supp. 2004) ("No judgment of termina-
tion of parental rights entered under sections 571-61 to 571-63 shall operate to terminate
the mutual rights of inheritance of the child and the parent or parents involved . . . ." (em-
phasis added)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4056(1) (2004) ("An order terminating pa-
rental rights divests the parent and the child of all legal rights, powers, privileges, immu-
nities, duties and obligations to each other as parent and child, except the inheritance
rights between the child and his parent." (emphasis added)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-
C:12 (LexisNexis 2001) ("An order terminating the parent-child relationship shall divest
the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations .... The
rights of inheritance of both the parent and the child shall not be divested until the adop-
tion of said child." (emphasis added)).
24. See supra note 23.
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call Type B statutes. Some Type B statutes explicitly extinguish
the inheritance rights of the parent but do not address the inheri-
tance rights of the child.2" Other Type B statutes explicitly extin-
guish the inheritance rights of the parent while explicitly pre-
serving the inheritance rights of the child.26 Yet another variant
of the Type B statute explicitly extinguishes the inheritance
rights of both the parent and the child. 27
Other statutes fail to expressly address the inheritance rights
of the parent at all. Most commonly, these statutes explicitly pre-
serve the inheritance rights of the child but are silent as to the ef-
fect of termination of the inheritance rights of the parent.2" The
25. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-293 (2004) ("An order terminating the parent-
juvenile relationship shall divest the parent and juvenile of all legal rights, privileges, du-
ties, and obligations with respect to each other and the parents shall have no rights of in-
heritance with respect to such juvenile." (emphasis added)).
26. See, e7.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583a(f) (2000) ("A termination of parental rights
.. .shall not terminate the right of the child to inherit from or through the parent. Upon
such termination, all the rights of birth parents to such child, including their right to in-
herit from or through such child, shall cease." (emphasis added)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7006-1.3(A) (West 1998) ("The termination of parental rights terminates the parent-child
relationship, including ... the parent's right to inherit from or through the child. Provided,
that nothing herein shall in any way affect the right of the child to inherit from the parent."
(emphasis added)); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(5) (2002) (('(A]n order terminating residual
parental rights... shall terminate the rights of the parent to take from or through the child
in question but the order shall not otherwise affect the rights of the child, the child's kin-
dred, or the parent's kindred.. . ." (emphasis added)).
27. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1113(b) (1999) ("Upon the issuance of an order
terminating the existing parental rights .... the child shall lose all rights of inheritance
from the parents whose parental rights were terminated.., and the parents whose parental
rights were terminated . . . shall lose all rights of inheritance from the child." (emphasis
added)); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-93 (2005) ("An order terminating the parental rights of a
parent ... is without limit as to duration and terminates all the parent's rights and obli-
gations with respect to the child and all rights and obligations of the child to the parent
arising from the parental relationship, including rights of inheritance." (emphasis added));
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2011 (2001) ("An order terminating the parent and child relation-
ship shall divest the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obliga-
tions, including rights of inheritance, with respect to each other." (emphasis added)); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.015(1) (2004) (defining the "parent and child relationship" to in-
clude "all rights, privileges and obligations existing between parent and child, including
rights of inheritance." (emphasis added)). While it is not entirely clear from the text of the
Georgia statute above that it applies to both the child and the parent, a Georgia court has
held that the language of an almost identical predecessor statute acts to terminate the in-
heritance rights of both parent and child from each other. See Spence v. Levi, 211 S.E.2d
622, 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
28. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (1999) ( "An order terminating the parent-child re-
lationship shall divest the parent and the child of all legal rights ... with respect to each
other except the right of the child to inherit ... from the parent. This right of inheritance
... shall only be terminated by a final order of adoption." (emphasis added)); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-3-608(1) (2004) ("An order for the termination of the parent-child legal relation-
20061
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Connecticut statute is typical, providing that "'[t]ermination of
ship divests the child and the parent of all legal rights ... with respect to each other, but
it shall not modify the child's status as an heir at law which shall cease only upon a final
decree of adoption." (emphasis added)); D.C. CODE § 16-2361(a) (2001) ('An order terminat-
ing the parent and child relationship divests the parent and the child of all legal rights ...
with respect to each other, except the right of the child to inherit from his or her parent.
The right of inheritance of the child shall be terminated only by a final order of adoption."
(emphasis added)); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.104 (LexisNexis 1999) ('Following the entry
of an order involuntarily terminating parental rights in a child, the child shall retain the
right to inherit from his parent under the laws of descent and distribution until the child is
adopted." (emphasis added)); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1038 (2004) ('A final judgment
terminating parental rights relieves the child and the parent... of all of their legal duties
and divests them of all of their legal rights with regard to one another ... except: (1) The
right of the child to inherit from his biological parents and other relatives." (emphasis
added)); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-611(1) (2003) ("An order for the termination of the par-
ent-child legal relationship divests the child and the parents of all legal rights, powers,
immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to each other .... except tihe right of the
child to inherit from the parent." (emphasis added)); N.M. STAT. § 32A-4-29(P) (2004) ("A
judgment of the court terminating parental rights divests the parent of all legal rights and
privileges .... A judgment of the court terminating parental rights shall .not affect the
child's rights of inheritance from and through the child's biological parents." (emphasis
added)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1112 (2003) ("An order terminating the parental rights...
terminates all rights... of the parent to the juvenile and of the juvenile to the parent aris-
ing from the parental relationship, except that the juvenile's right of inheritance from the
juvenile's parent shall not terminate until a final order of adoption is issued." (emphasis
added)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1576(A) (Supp. 2004) ("An order terminating the relation-
ship between parent and child ... divests the parent and the child of all legal rights...
with respect to each other, except the right of the child to inherit from the parent. A right of
inheritance is terminated only by a final order of adoption." (emphasis added)); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(l) (Supp. 2004) ("An order terminating parental rights shall have
the effect of severing forever all legal rights ... of the parent ... and of the child .... Not-
withstanding the provisions of subdivision (l)(1), a child.., shall be entitled to inherit from
a parent whose rights are terminated until the final order of adoption is entered." (empha-
sis added)); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) ("[A]n order
terminating the parent-child relationship divests the parent and the child of all legal
rights and duties with respect to each other, except that the child retains the right to in-
herit from and through the parent unless the court otherwise provides." (emphasis added)).
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-413(1) (2002) ('An order for the termination of the par-
ent-child legal relationship divests the child and the parents of all legal rights, powers,
immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to each other, except the right of the child
to inherit from the parent." (emphasis added)); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-317(a) (2005) ("An
order terminating the parent-child legal relationship divests the parent of all legal rights
and privileges and relieves the child of all duties to that parent except... [t]he right of the
child to inherit from the parent shall not be affected by the order." (emphasis added)).
[Vol. 40:447
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parental rights' means the complete severance by court order of
the legal relationship ... between the child and the child's parent
or parents so that the child is free for adoption except it shall not
affect the right of inheritance of the child."29 I will call such stat-
utes Type C statutes. While Type C statutes fail explicitly to ad-
dress the right of the parent to inherit from the child after the
termination, Type C statutes seem implicitly to extinguish the
right of the parent to inherit. The parent's right to inherit can
hardly continue to exist in the face of statutory language that
terminates all rights and duties between parent and child except
the right of the child to inherit.3 ° In fact, in one of the very few
judicial decisions interpreting these provisions of the TPR stat-
utes, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that under the Ken-
tucky statute31 (a typical Type C statute), a father whose parental
rights had been terminated had no intestate or inheritance claim
to his child's estate.32 It is less clear, however, whether Type C
statutes act to terminate the right of relatives of the terminated
parent to inherit from the child through the terminated parent.
In other words, should a termination of parental rights order pre-
clude a grandparent, or an aunt or uncle, or even another child of
the terminated parent from inheriting from his or her grandchild,
or niece or nephew, or brother or sister?
33
Finally, some statutes-Type D statutes-make no reference at
all to inheritance rights of either parent or child.34 We cannot
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-707(8) (West 2004).
30. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:08 (6th
ed., rev. 2000). ("[T]he legislative purpose set forth in the purview of an enactment is as-
sumed to express the legislative policy, and only those subjects expressly exempted by the
proviso should be freed from the operation of the statute.").
31. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.104 (LexisNexis 1999).
32. Scott v. Montgomery Traders & Trust Co., 956 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Ky. 1997).
33. For a discussion of this question, see infra Part V.
34. See, e.g., IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-35-6-4(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2003) ("[AIll rights, pow-
ers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations, including any rights to custody, con-
trol, visitation, or support, pertaining to the relationship, are permanently terminated.
. .."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(56) (West Supp. 2005) ("Termination of the parent-child
relationship' means the divestment by the court of the parent's and child's privileges, du-
ties and powers with respect to each other."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.317 (West 2003)
("Upon the termination of parental rights all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, du-
ties, and obligations, including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or support exist-
ing between the child and the parent shall be severed and terminated ... ."); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-20-46(1) (Supp. 2005) ("An order terminating parental rights of a parent termi-
nates all the parent's rights and obligations with respect to the child and of the child to or
through the parent arising from the parental relationship."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-
505(a) (2002) ("An order issued under this part granting the petition . . .terminates the
20061
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know with any certainty how a court in a Type D jurisdiction will
treat the inheritance rights of the terminated parent. Although
Type D statutes do not expressly extinguish the inheritance
rights of the terminated parents, there is reason to think that
they may well be interpreted as having that effect. The language
used in many Type D statutes to describe the effect of a termina-
tion order is quite broad,35 suggesting that all legal rights and ob-
ligations existing between the parent and the child are termi-
nated. The Wisconsin statute, for instance, provides that "[a]n
order terminating parental rights permanently severs all legal
rights and duties between the parent and the child."36 It would
seem difficult for a court to interpret such broad language as pre-
serving the right of the parent to inherit from the child. In fact,
we have further indication of the way in which courts are likely to
interpret the effect of such broad statutory language on the right
of a terminated parent to inherit from the few cases that have ex-
plicitly or implicitly applied such language to the right of a child
to inherit from his or her terminated parent. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota, for instance, interpreted a Type D statute to extin-
guish the right of a child to inherit from a terminated parent.37
Several other courts, while not directly addressing the right of the
child to inherit from a terminated parent, have assumed without
discussion that the child's right to inherit is terminated by a Type
D statute.3" Given that the primary purpose of TPR statutes is to
protect the child,39 it seems inconceivable that courts that con-
strue a statute to extinguish the rights of the object of that TPR
statutory protection, the child, would construe the same statute
as preserving the right of the terminated parent to inherit from
the child.
Most state TPR statutes, then, either explicitly or implicitly ex-
tinguish the right of a terminated parent to inherit from the
child. Type B statutes explicitly extinguish the parent's inheri-
tance rights, while Type C statutes almost certainly extinguish
those rights implicitly. And although Type D statutes do not di-
relationship of parent and child between the respondent and the minor.. .
35. See supra note 34.
36. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.43(2) (West 2003).
37. See In re Estate of Braa, 452 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Minn. 1990); see also Brown, supra
note 14, at 136 (providing additional discussion of the Braa case).
38. See Brown, supra note 14, at 136-38 & nn.61-66.
39. Id. at 141.
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rectly address the inheritance rights of either parent or child,
they typically use very broad language to describe the effect of the
termination order; and thus, they are likely to be interpreted to
extinguish the inheritance rights of the parent (and perhaps the
child as well). Only Type A statutes, which are uncommon,
clearly preserve the rights of the terminated parent to inherit.
Extinguishing the inheritance rights of parents whose parental
rights have been terminated may seem, at first blush, eminently
justifiable. Surely, parents who have failed to meet their parental
responsibilities so egregiously as to warrant termination of pa-
rental rights should not be able to benefit from their now termi-
nated parental relationship. But is it that simple? Should the fact
that a parent's rights have been terminated automatically result
in the extinguishing of the parent's right to inherit from the child,
and, if so, why?4"
III. UNDESERVING HEIRS-ANALOGIES FROM OTHER CONTEXTS
Can we argue that the inheritance rights of terminated parents
should be extinguished because the parental malfeasance or non-
feasance that led to the termination proceeding makes the par-
ents undeserving heirs? Generally, the worthiness or unworthi-
ness of individual heirs is not relevant to the determination of
inheritance rights.41 The right to inherit and the portion of the
decedent's estate to be inherited are determined solely by me-
chanical application of the intestate succession statutes and not
by any assessment of the worthiness of the various potential
heirs." The fact that the decedent's daughter has been dutiful
and attentive, while the decedent's son has been rebellious and
inattentive, is irrelevant to the determination of the inheritance
40. The most straightforward potential answer would be what I call the "definitional"
approach. If the intestate succession statutes provide for inheritance by parents, biological
parents whose parental rights have been terminated are, by definition, no longer to be
considered as parents and thus no longer entitled to inherit. That approach, however,
seems too simplistic. The biological parent-child relationship is of fundamental signifi-
cance in our culture and in our legal system. Our inheritance system in particular is based
on the assumption that blood relationships are of paramount importance in determining
inheritance rights. The right of biological parents to inherit should be extinguished only
for well considered policy reasons. This article therefore turns to consideration of possible
policy rationales for extinguishing the inheritance rights of terminated parents.
41. See Monopoli, supra note 3, at 259-60.
42. See id.
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shares of either.43 The worthiness of the heir need not be irrele-
vant to the disposition of the decedent's estate, of course. The de-
cedent could have reflected the relative deservingness of his two
children in a will.44 But, in the absence of a will, the comparative
merits of the two children are completely beside the point.45
But are there circumstances in which the worthiness of the po-
tential heir ought to be relevant to the ability of the heir to in-
herit? Are there instances in which the conduct of the potential
heir toward the decedent is so egregious that the bad behavior
ought to render the heir ineligible to inherit? And, if so, should
terminated parents be so categorized?
A. Undeserving Heirs-The Slayer Statute Analogy
Despite the general rule that the worthiness of individual heirs
is irrelevant, most American jurisdictions recognize at least one
situation in which the individual unworthiness of the heir is rele-
vant-in fact, disqualifying.46 If I murder my rich Aunt Suzy in
order to inherit her estate, I am almost certain to be disqualified
from inheriting from her.47 That disqualification results from
what is known as the slayer rule.4" The rule appeared first as a
judicial application of the equitable maxim nullus commodum ca-
pere potest de injuria sua propria ("no one shall take advantage of
his own wrong").4 9 In most states, the common law rule has been
supplanted, or supplemented, by statutes known as "slayer stat-
43. See id.
44. A testator's freedom to reward the individual worthiness of any potential devisee
is not unbounded. A parent's desire to reward through devise the worthiness of a child, for
instance, is limited in many states by forced or elective share statutes that protect surviv-
ing spouses from disinheritance by providing that surviving spouses may elect to take a
statutorily prescribed share of the testator's estate rather than taking under the will. See
generally DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 425-28; McGOVERN & KURTz, supra note 1,
at 147-57.
45. See Foster, supra note 3, at 79 & n.4.
46. See William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 65, 65 (1969).
47. See id.
48. For more expansive treatments of the development of the slayer rule, see gener-
ally Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV.
489 (1986); McGovern, supra note 46; Sherman, supra note 19, at 844-56.
49. WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC LAW
DICTIONARY 710 (James C. Cahill ed., 2d ed. 1922).
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utes."50 These statutes are by no means uniform in their scope
and effect. 51 They vary in their definitions of which slayers are so
unworthy as to be disqualified from inheriting.5 2 Some slayer
statutes bar inheritance only by intentional killers, while others
extend the bar to at least some unintentional killers.53 Some ap-
ply expressly only to the decedent's probate estate, while others
extend to non-probate assets.54 But despite these variations, the
essential thrust of all slayer statutes is the same-to disinherit
the most egregiously unworthy of heirs.
The rationales underlying slayer statutes are largely intuitive
and, in most applications, persuasive.55 The statutes reflect, as
did the common law rule, the equitable notion that wrongdoers
should not be allowed to profit from their wrongdoing.56 The rule,
however, is not simply an expression of moral judgment about
slayers. As Professor Sherman has pointed out, slayer statutes
are not a form of criminal penalty.5" Rather, they are "designed to
preserve the integrity of our property-transfer system by prevent-
ing a person from altering, by means of a wrongful slaying, the
course of property succession as intended by the source of the
property."" Closely allied to this notion of the wrongness of allow-
ing murderers to reorder succession in order to profit from their
killing is the desire to deter opportunistic killing by heirs.59 Al-
lowing me to inherit from my rich Aunt Suzy would encourage
other would-be heirs to kill their rich relatives.6 ° The slayer rule
is also explained as a mechanism for protecting the presumed in-
tent of the decedent.61 We presume that my rich Aunt Suzy, if she
could express her intentions from her grave, would not intend for
me, her killer, to inherit her wealth.
50. See McGOVERN & KURTz, supra note 1, at 75-76; Sherman, supra note 19, at 846
& n.207 (providing a list of state slayer statutes).
51. See Sherman, supra note 19, at 848-49.
52. See McGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 1, at 76-77.
53. See id.; see also Sherman, supra note 19, at 848-51.
54. See McGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 1, at 75-76.
55. As Professor Sherman has argued, the rationales underlying the slayer statutes
seem far less persuasive when applied to mercy killings. See Sherman, supra note 19, at
874.
56. See McGOVERN & KURTz, supra note 1, at 75.
57. Sherman, supra note 19, at 859.
58. Id. at 860.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 861.
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Are these rationales transferable to the termination of parental
rights context and do they suggest that terminated parents, like
slayers, should be barred from inheriting? The answer would
seem to be no. The slayer statute rationales do not seem to be
readily transferable to termination of parental rights. Slayer
statutes are fundamentally different from the disinheritance pro-
visions of TPR statutes.63 A direct causal relationship between
the unworthy act (the killing of the decedent) and the potential
for inheritance underlies the slayer statutes.64 In the absence of
the killer's bad act, there would be no inheritance at all, because
the decedent would not have died. In contrast, there is no such
causal link in the termination of parental rights context.65 The
bad acts of the terminated parent (abuse, neglect, abandonment,
etc.) bear no causal relationship to inheritance. 66 So, while slayer
statutes bar the unworthy heir because the slayer's bad act itself
altered the intended property disposition of the decedent, TPR
statutes disinherit the terminated parent not because the par-
ent's bad acts had any causal connection with the inheritance, but
rather because it simply seems wrong to allow a "bad" parent to
benefit from his or her parental status.67
The second rationale supporting the slayer statutes-
deterrence-flows directly from this causal relationship between
the bad act (the killing) and the inheritance. 6' Allowing the killer
to benefit directly from his bad act-killing the decedent-would
encourage such killings.69 Again, however, that rationale seems
inapplicable to TPR statutes, where there is no causal link be-
tween the bad act and the inheritance. It might be argued that
the disinheritance features of many TPR statutes do play a deter-
rence role-that the threat of losing inheritance rights will deter
parents from acting abusively or neglectfully toward their chil-
dren. That notion, however, seems fanciful. Whatever forces drive
parents to abuse or neglect their children would hardly seem
62. See Monopoli, supra note 3, at 273-75.
63. See id. at 274-75.
64. See id. at 275.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Professor Monopoli makes much the same point in her discussion of rationales for
statutes that disinherit parents who fail to support a child. See id. at 274-75.
68. See id. at 275.
69. See Sherman, supra note 19, at 860.
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amenable to influence by the distant prospect that they will out-
live their children and that their children will leave substantial
estates.7 ° The possibility of inheritance from a child must seem so
remote to parents as to be a negligible, or more likely a non-
existent, factor in their choice of behaviors.71
The third rationale supporting slayer statutes-the presump-
tion that the decedent would not have wanted his killer to inherit
his estate-seems more relevant to the disinheritance provisions
of TPR statutes. Perhaps the central purpose of the intestate suc-
cession scheme is to replicate the presumed intent of decedents.72
Furthermore, we might want to be particularly sensitive to the
presumed intent of children because children cannot opt out of
the intestacy scheme.73 Adults can easily avoid the default rules
of the intestate succession statutes by executing a will. Children,
however, lack the legal competence to execute wills and thus can-
not opt out of the intestate succession scheme.74 But what should
we presume children of terminated parents would intend? It may
seem intuitively correct that an abused or neglected child would
not want his abusive or neglectful parent to inherit, but that in-
tuition may not be correct. Professor Monopoli has noted that "lit-
erature on child psychology establishes that even children with
abusive and neglectful parents desperately want to maintain
their relationship with those parents" and that "[s]tudies indicate
that children continue to love and bond with parents who have
badly abused and/or abandoned them."7 5 Similarly, Professor Ap-
pell has noted that "foster children have persistent psychic ties to
their parents. They frequently express a continuing desire to visit
their biological parents and, in some cases, a desire to resume liv-
ing with them. In fact, foster children may experience termina-
tion of parental rights and adoption as unreasonable and unnatu-
70. Professor Monopoli discusses the same concern (whether the possibility of disin-
heritance will affect the behavior of inadequate parents) in the context of statutes that dis-
inherit fathers that fail to support their children. See Monopoli, supra note 3, at 281-82.
71. See id. at 281.
72. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 321,
323-24.
73. See Monopoli, supra note 3, at 274 ("Depriving an American decedent of the usual
ability to cut out someone who has wronged him militates in favor of a statute which will
accomplish that very act.").
74. See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 1, at 292.
75. Monopoli, supra note 3, at 277.
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ral."76 In any event, we simply lack evidence that would tell us
whether or not the typical child whose parents have been termi-
nated would want those parents to inherit from them. It is a
question about which these children almost certainly have never
thought.
B. Undeserving Heirs-The Spousal Misconduct and Parental
Failure to Support Analogy
The rationales that underlie the slayer statutes, then, do not
seem applicable to disinheritance provisions of TPR statutes. But,
should disinheritance on the basis of "unworthiness" be extended
beyond slayer statutes to instances, like termination of parental
rights, in which there is no causal link between the bad behavior
of the potential heir and the availability of an inheritable estate?
In other words, should we bar inheritance simply because the
heir's conduct toward the decedent may have been reprehensible?
In fact, such bars to inheritance do exist. Although they are less
common than slayer statutes, these other inheritance bars based
on the individual unworthiness of the potential heir may be more
analogous to TPR statutes.
One example is spousal misconduct. The notion that marital
misconduct could disqualify the misbehaving spouse from inherit-
ing from the wronged spouse has deep historical roots." Several
states, by statute, now bar inheritance by spouses who have
committed adultery or abandoned or failed to support the dece-
dent spouse.78
76. Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L.
421, 447 (2004) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003)) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Professor Roberts has
noted that "most children in foster care, who typically have been removed because of ne-
glect, have close and loving relationships with their parents, and it is indescribably pain-
ful to be separated from them." DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF
CHILD WELFARE 17-18 (2002).
77. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 37, at 148-53 (2d
ed. 1953).
78. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-436(g) (West 2004) ("A surviving husband
or wife shall not be entitled to a statutory share ... or an intestate share ... in the prop-
erty of the other if such surviving spouse, without sufficient cause, abandoned the other
and continued such abandonment to the time of the other's death."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
392.090(2) (LexisNexis 1999) ("If either spouse voluntarily leaves the other and lives in
adultery, the offending party forfeits all right and interest in and to the property and es-
tate of the other, unless they afterward become reconciled and live together as husband
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Other states, in statutes even more relevant to our discussion,
bar inheritance by parents who have failed to support their chil-
dren. 9 In the absence of such statutes, courts have almost in-
variably allowed abandoning, neglectful, or even abusive parents
to take their prescribed intestate share upon the death of their
natural children."0 A number of states, however, have (or have
had) statutes that preclude inheritance by a narrow class of "un-
worthy" parents-non-marital fathers who have not acknowl-
edged or supported their biological children."1
These statutory limitations on the right of non-marital fathers
to inherit from their children may be explained by two ration-
ales. 2 First, the ability of non-marital fathers to inherit from
their natural children is dependent on proof of paternity, and pro-
viding support is an indication of paternity. Second, barring the
non-marital father from inheriting serves to punish a father who
has "already done the child a great disservice by burdening the
child with the social and legal disability of illegitimacy." 4
A very few states have extended the inheritance bar to "unwor-
thy" parents more broadly-mothers as well as fathers and mari-
tal as well as non-marital parents. North Carolina enacted the
and wife."); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West Supp. 2005) ("If any married person voluntar-
ily leaves his or her spouse and goes away and continues with an adulterer or abandons
his or her spouse without reasonable cause and continues to live separate and apart from
his or her spouse for one whole year next preceding his or her death, or dwells with an-
other in a state of adultery continuously, such spouse is forever barred from his or her in-
heritance rights, homestead allowance, exempt property or any statutory allowances from
the estate of his or her spouse unless such spouse is voluntarily reconciled to him or her
and resumes cohabitation with him or her."); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a)
(Consol. 1979 & Supp. 2005) ("A husband or wife is a surviving spouse... unless it is es-
tablished... that: ... (5) The spouse abandoned the deceased spouse, and such abandon-
ment continued until the time of death. (6) A spouse who, having the duty to support the
other spouse, failed or refused to provide for such spouse though he or she had the means
or ability to do so, unless such marital duty was resumed and continued until the death of
the spouse having the need of support."); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §. 2106(a) (West Supp.
2005) ("A spouse who, for one year or upwards previous to the death of the other spouse,
has willfully neglected or refused to perform the duty to support the other spouse, or who
for one year or upwards has willfully and maliciously deserted the other spouse, shall have
no right or interest under this chapter in the real or personal estate of the other spouse.").
79. For a thorough discussion of these statutes, see Rhodes, supra note 3, at 532-41,
and Monopoli, supra note 3, at 265-73.
80. See Rhodes, supra note 3, at 524.
81. See Monopoli, supra note 3, at 263.
82. See id. at 263-64.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 264.
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earliest of these statutes in 1927.5 The state legislature enacted
the statute in reaction to a Supreme Court of North Carolina de-
cision decided the previous year in which the court held that a fa-
ther who had abandoned his child was nonetheless entitled to
share in a wrongful death award when the child was killed by fal-
ling through an elevator shaft."6 The North Carolina wrongful
death statute provided that wrongful death awards should be
disposed of in accordance with the state intestacy statute, which
provided for an equal allocation between mother and father if
both survived a child who left no spouse or issue.8 7 The court con-
cluded that it was bound by the statutory language and that to
"stretch the language of the statute .. .to meet the facts in the
present case" would "make, and not construe, the law."8 In re-
sponse to that decision, the North Carolina legislature enacted a
statute providing "that a parent, or parents, who has willfully
abandoned the care, custody, nurture and maintenance of such
child to its kindred, relatives or other person, shall forfeit all and
every right to participate in any part of said child's estate under
the provisions of this section."8 9
North Carolina was followed by the enactment of similar stat-
utes in New York in 1941,90 and in the 1980's through 2000,
85. See Act of Mar. 9, 1927, ch. 231, 1927 N.C. Sess. Laws 591-92; Rhodes, supra note
3, at 532.
86. See Avery v. Brantley, 131 S.E. 721, 722-23 (N.C. 1926).
87. See id. at 721-22.
88. Id. at 722 (internal citation omitted).
89. Act of Mar. 9, 1927, ch. 231, 1927 N.C. Sess. Laws 591-92 (quotation marks omit-
ted). The current version of the statute provides:
Any parent who has willfully abandoned the care and maintenance of his or
her child shall lose all right to intestate succession in any part of the child's
estate and all right to administer the estate of the child, except-
(1) Where the abandoning parent resumed its care and maintenance at
least one year prior to the death of the child and continued the same
until its death; or
(2) Where a parent has been deprived of the custody of his or her child
under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent has
substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribu-
tion to the support of the child.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31A-2 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2004). For recent commentary on
the history and scope of section 31A-2, see Heyward D. Armstrong, Comment, In re Estate
of Lunsford and Statutory Ambiguity: Trying to Reconcile Child Abandonment and the In-
testate Succession Act, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1149 (2003).
90. See N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 87 (Baldwin Supp. 1941). The current version of the
statute provides:
No distributive share in the estate of a deceased child shall be allowed to a
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Pennsylvania,91  Connecticut,92  Virginia, 93 Ohio, 94  South Caro-
parent who has failed or refused to provide for, or has abandoned such child
while such child is under the age of twenty-one years, whether or not such
child dies before having attained the age of twenty-one years, unless the pa-
rental relationship and duties are subsequently resumed and continue until
the death of the child.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4(a) (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 2005).
91. The current version of the statute provides:
Any parent who, for one year or upwards previous to the death of the parent's
minor or dependent child, has:
(1) failed to perform the duty to support the minor or dependent child
or who, for one year, has deserted the minor or dependent child; or
(2) been convicted of one of the following offenses under Title 18:
section 4303 (relating to concealing death of child); section 4304
(relating to endangering welfare of children);
section 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children); or an equiva-
lent crime under Federal law or the law of another state involv-
ing his or her child;
shall have no right or interest under this chapter in the real or personal es-
tate of the minor or dependent child. The determination under paragraph (1)
shall be made by the court after considering the quality, nature and extent of
the parent's contact with the child and the physical, emotional and financial
support provided to the child.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106(b) (West Supp. 2005).
92. The current version of the statute provides:
If there are no children or any legal representatives of them, then, after the
portion of the husband or wife, if any, is distributed or set out, the residue of
the estate shall be distributed equally to the parent or parents of the intes-
tate, provided no parent who has abandoned a minor child and continued
such abandonment until the time of death of such child, shall be entitled to
share in the estate of such child or be deemed a parent for the purposes of
subdivisions (2) to (4), inclusive, of this subsection.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-439(a)(1) (West 2004).
93. The current version of the statute provides:
If a parent willfully deserts or abandons his or her minor or incapacitated
child and such desertion or abandonment continues until the death of the
child, the parent shall be barred of all interest in the estate of the child by in-
testate succession unless the parent resumes the parental relationship and
duties and such parental relationship and duties continue until the death of
the child.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3(B) (2002).
94. The current version of the statute provides:
Subject to divisions (C), (D), and (E) of this section, a parent who has aban-
doned his minor child who subsequently dies intestate as a minor shall not
inherit the real or personal property of the deceased child pursuant to section
2105.06 of the Revised Code. If a parent is prohibited by this division from
inheriting from his deceased child, the real or personal property of the de-
ceased child shall be distributed, or shall descend and pass in parcenary, pur-
suant to section 2105.06 of the Revised Code as if the parent had predeceased
the deceased child.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10(B) (LexisNexis 2002).
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lina,9" and Kentucky. 96 The 1990 Uniform Probate Code includes
a related provision in section 2-114, the section defining the par-
ent-child relationship. 7 Subsection (c) of section 2-114 provides
that "[i]nheritance from or through a child by either natural par-
ent or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless that natural parent
has openly treated the child as his [or hers], and has not refused
to support the child."98 The new section 2-114 substantially ex-
pands the scope of the inheritance bar beyond that of the old sec-
tion 2-109(2), which barred only non-marital fathers who failed to
acknowledge and support the child.99 Some commentators have
argued that statutes that disinherit abandoning or non-
supporting parents should be more widely adopted.' 0
IV. TERMINATED PARENTS AS UNDESERVING HEIRS
This gets us to the heart of the matter-should the approach
exemplified by statutes that bar inheritance by "unworthy"
spouses or parents be incorporated into the termination of paren-
95. The current version of the statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the parents of the deceased
would be the intestate heirs pursuant to Section 62-2-103(2), upon the motion
of either parent or any other party of potential interest based upon the dece-
dent having died intestate, the probate court may deny or limit either or both
parent's entitlement for a share of the proceeds if the court determines, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the parent or parents failed to reasona-
bly provide support for the decedent as defined in Section 20-7-40 and did not
otherwise provide for the needs of the decedent during his or her minority.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-114 (Supp. 2004).
96. The current version of the statute provides:
A parent who has willfully abandoned the care and maintenance of his or her
child shall not have a right to intestate succession in any part of the estate
and shall not have a right to administer the estate of the child, unless:
(a) The abandoning parent had resumed the care and maintenance at
least one (1) year prior to the death of the child and had continued
the care and maintenance until the child's death; or
(b) The parent had been deprived of the custody of his or her child un-
der an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent
had substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring
contribution to the support of the child.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.033(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). See Rhodes, supra note
3, at 532-37, and Armstrong, supra note 89, at 1172 n.146, from both of whom I
have borrowed this chronology of statutory adoptions.
97. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 2003).
98. Id. at § 2-114(c) (alterations in original).
99. See id. at § 2-109(2) (repealed 1990).
100. See, e.g., Monopoli, supra note 3, at 298; Rhodes, supra note 3, at 518.
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tal rights process? Or, to ask that question in broader form, what
justifiable purposes are served by extinguishing the inheritance
rights of terminated parents? Does cutting off the inheritance
rights of terminated parents benefit the child, or other identifi-
able persons, or society in general?
A. Terminated Parents as Undeserving Heirs-The Benefit to the
Child Rationale
Is the child benefited? Arguably, the child could be benefited in
two ways-first, because the threat of disinheritance deters bad
parental behavior or, second, because the presumed intent of the
child is furthered by disinheriting the parent. But, as discussed in
conjunction with the slayer statutes,1"' which do rely in part on
these rationales, neither rationale seems persuasive when ap-
plied to termination of parental rights. The likelihood that abu-
sive, neglectful, or incapable parents will be effectively encour-
aged to perform their parenting responsibilities by the possibility
of inheriting from their children seems highly improbable.' 2 Nor
is it clear that barring even "bad" parents from inheriting reflects
the intent of the child.' 3 If barring a parent from inheriting does
not benefit the child during the child's life by deterring bad par-
enting and does not necessarily reflect the intent of the child, it is
hard to see how the child is benefited in any way at all.
But even if extinguishing the inheritance rights of terminated
parents does not benefit the child, we may think it simply unfair
that a parent who is so evil or inept as to be terminated should be
able to inherit from the child. But unfair in what way? And unfair
to whom? Do we mean unfair to specific, identifiable persons, or
do we mean unfair in a more generalized way, reflecting our
sense that it is simply wrong to allow a parent to benefit from a
relationship in which the parent did not fulfill his or her most ba-
sic responsibilities? We might, in fact, mean both.
101. See supra Section III.A.
102. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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B. Terminated Parents as Undeserving Heirs-The Fairness to
Other Caregivers Rationale
Allowing a terminated parent to inherit might be unfair to spe-
cific persons in the sense that the terminated parent's share of
the inheritance would likely reduce the share that would other-
wise go to those who bore the costs and responsibilities of rearing
the child. 114 For instance, if only one parent has been terminated,
the cost and responsibility of raising the child likely falls on the
non-terminated parent. Most intestate succession statutes pro-
vide that, in the absence of spouse or issue, the decedent's estate
will pass to the parents,' although in a very few states, the par-
ents will share with the decedent's siblings.0 6 If only one parent
survives, the surviving parent generally will take the entire es-
tate.10 7 In most jurisdictions, then, if the terminated parent can
inherit, his share will reduce the share of the non-terminated
parent who bore the responsibility and cost of rearing the child.
In contrast, if the terminated parent is barred from inheriting,
the non-terminated parent is likely to inherit the entire estate,
which may be a fairer result. Similarly, if both parents have been
terminated, the estate may well escheat to the state.' 8 If, as a re-
sult of the termination of the parental rights of both parents, the
child has become a ward of the state, perhaps that result is fair,
as the financial burden of raising the child has fallen to the tax-
payers. This might seem a plausible rationale for disinheriting
some terminated parents. Unfortunately, however, TPR statutes
do not simply authorize extinguishing inheritance rights in such
circumstances. Rather, the statutes impose blanket disinheri-
tance on all terminated parents, regardless of the alternative dis-
position that will result.
104. For a discussion of the protection of the interests of a non-abandoning parent in
the context of parental misconduct statutes, see Monopoli, supra note 3, at 278-79.
105. See Rhodes, supra note 3, at 519.
106. See id. at 519-20.
107. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2103(2) (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45a-439(a)(1) (West 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.04.015(2)(b) (West 1998); UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-103(2) (amended 2003).
108. This result will be obtained if the effect of the termination of parental rights is to
bar inheritance not only by the terminated parents themselves, but by kin of the termi-
nated parents as well. See infra Part V, which discusses whether, in fact, the inheritance
rights of the kin of terminated parents should be extinguished.
[Vol. 40:447
UNDESERVING HEIRS?
C. Terminated Parents as Undeserving Heirs-The Punishment
of "Bad" Parents Rationale
What about the broader notion of unfairness-the idea that it
is simply wrong to allow a parent, who was a sufficiently "bad"
parent to warrant termination of parental rights, to continue to
benefit from his status as a parent. Is it appropriate for the TPR
and intestacy schemes to incorporate and effectuate that general
sense of fairness? Replicating the presumed intent of those who
die without wills has often been identified as the primary goal of
intestate succession statutes. 109 Other societal goals have been
identified as well, including protecting the decedent's family,
avoiding complicating and excessively subdividing property titles,
promoting the nuclear family, and encouraging the accumulation
of property. 10 All of these are instrumental goals. Is it also ap-
propriate to use the intestacy regime simply to declare society's
disapproval of particular behaviors, even if there is no reasonable
likelihood that the intestacy statutes will in fact deter undesir-
able behaviors? Or, to rephrase the issue, is it appropriate to use
the inheritance system as a means of punishing bad behavior? If
we do want to use inheritance bars as a form of punishment, how
do we determine which parents are sufficiently "bad" to warrant
punishment? Is it accurate to characterize every terminated par-
ent as a "bad" parent who is unworthy of inheriting? How are we
to be sure that the objects of punitive measures deserve punish-
ment? Who are these "bad" parents, and how and why are they
"bad"?
1. The Over-Inclusiveness of Automatic Disinheritance
If our goal is "punishment" of bad parents, the disinheritance
provisions of TPR statutes are poorly tailored to achieve that
purpose, being both seriously over-inclusive and under-inclusive.
For instance, if we accept the premise that it is appropriate to use
the withholding of inheritance rights as a method of punishing
bad behavior, it is fairly easy to conclude that it is appropriate to
bar a parent who has been physically or sexually abusive from
inheriting from his victim. But termination of parental rights
109. See Fellows et al., supra note 72, at 323-24.
110. Id. at 324.
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generally is authorized not just for abuse, but for neglect as
well.111 In fact, the majority of child maltreatment cases involve
neglect rather than abuse.112 The neglect that triggers termina-
tion of parental rights can be the result of circumstances clearly
beyond the control of the terminated parent, such as mental ill-
ness or mental retardation. 113 In such instances, we should recog-
nize that termination flows from the inability of the parents to
perform adequately as parents, rather than from any morally
reprehensible behavior by the parents. A brief sketch of several
recent termination of parental rights cases may illustrate that
distinction.
In R.G. and T.G. v. Marion County Office, Department of Fam-
ily and Children,"4 the Court of Appeals of Indiana upheld the
termination of parental rights of a mother and father who were
both mildly retarded-the mother's IQ was sixty-four and the fa-
ther's was sixty-two." 5 Their child, who was born five weeks pre-
mature," 6 suffered from hydrocephalus and was "moderately to
severely developmentally delayed," requiring "physical, occupa-
tional, and speech and language therapy.""' 7 While the court ac-
knowledged the mother's love for her child, it concluded that the
parents lacked "the skills and knowledge necessary to fulfill the
111. See 1 HOLLINGER ETAL., supra note 2, at § 4.04(l)(a).
112. See ROBERTS, supra note 76, at 34 ("[M]ost cases of child maltreatment stem from
parental neglect. Nationwide, there are twice as many neglected children as children who
are physically abused. In 1998, just over half (54 percent) of substantiated cases involved
neglect, compared to 23 percent involving physical abuse and 12 percent sexual abuse.");
see also Andrea Charlow, Race, Poverty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 763, 768
(2001).
113. See Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Ter-
mination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 387, 401-02 (2000).
[Ailmost every statute routinely includes mental or psychiatric disability and
developmental disability-under various pseudonyms-as factors for courts
to consider.
Whether specifically articulated or not, courts regularly sweep a label of
"mental deficiency" under the "unfitness" or "incapacitated" umbrella when
determining termination of parental rights. All too often there appears a pre-
sumption that 'mentally disabled' means an inability to adequately parent,
without proving a nexus between the disability and its manifestations, or an
individualized inquiry.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
114. 647 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
115. See id. at 327.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 329.
[Vol. 40:447
UNDESERVING HEIRS?
obligations of a parent to a child with the specialized needs of [the
parents' child] ."118 The court noted that the child's foster mother,
who had indicated a desire to adopt the child, had substantial ex-
perience working with developmentally disabled children.119
Given the limited abilities of the parents, the special needs of the
child, and the particular competence of the potential adoptive
parents, the court concluded that termination of parental rights
was appropriate. 120
A second example is provided by In re A. V.,121 in which the
Court of Appeals of Minnesota upheld the termination of parental
rights of the parents of two sets of twins. 2 2 Two of their four chil-
dren were developmentally delayed. 123 The father had fallen from
a roof in a construction accident, which caused impairment of his
cognitive functioning and his anger control ability, and the
mother suffered from personality disorder and low cognitive func-
tion.124 Noting that the trial court had "acknowledged the inher-
ent tragedy in its conclusion,"125 the appellate court concluded
that the parents simply lacked the capacity to parent. 126 In lan-
guage that is relevant to our consideration of the appropriateness
of punishing terminated parents by extinguishing their inheri-
tance rights, the court also concluded that "if the issue of palpable
unfitness were to be decided strictly on the basis of conduct and
not on the conditions of the parents, termination of parental
rights would be unwarranted under these circumstances." 27
In re Marcus W.128 provides a third example. In Marcus, the
Court of Appeals of Nebraska upheld the termination of the pa-
rental rights of a mother of three children. 129 The mother had
been diagnosed with "cognitive dysfunction consistent with fron-
tal lobe impairment, generalized anxiety disorder, and mood dis-
118. Id. at 330.
119. See id. at 329-30 n.9.
120. See id. at 330.
121. 593 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
122. See id. at 720-21.
123. See id. at 721.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 722.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
128. 649 N.W.2d 899 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).
129. See id. at 903-04.
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order." 3 ° She also suffered from hydrocephalus, which had re-
quired several shunts, and she suffered from seizures. 3' The
mother had an estimated IQ of seventy-three. 32 A licensed psy-
chologist and neuropsychologist had testified that the mother
"would need assistance for daily living activities which require
consistent attention or concentration, such as financial responsi-
bilities, medical decisionmaking, treatment compliance, and par-
enting"133 and that the mother's frontal lobe disorder "would be a
mental disease or defect that would significantly affect her ability
to parent the children.' 34 In language that highlights the tragedy
inflicted by these cases-not just on the children, but on the par-
ents as well- the court noted:
It is difficult to terminate the parental rights of someone who we be-
lieve truly loves her children, who appears to have consistently com-
plied with the numerous orders of the juvenile court, and who has
had this proceeding brought against her through no fault of her own.
... The fact that [the mother] has persisted over so many years in
trying to learn the necessary skills to care for her children makes a
determination that she is unfit very difficult. However, the evidence
is clear and convincing that she does not have the mental ability to
do so, in spite of her admirable efforts.
135
As these three cases demonstrate, parents who are in no way
morally culpable may be subject to termination of parental rights
and a consequent loss of inheritance rights. Parental rights also
may be terminated for reasons that courts view as blameworthy,
but that in fact may unfairly allocate the cause of harm to the
child. In a number of states, exposure to domestic violence has
been characterized as child maltreatment that warrants termina-
tion of parental rights.'36 Some state statutes explicitly enumer-
130. Id. at 905.




134. Id. at 912.
135. Id. at 913-14.
136. See Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence:
The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 92-98 (2001). For
more extensive discussion of the status of battered women in the child welfare system, see
G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recre-
ating the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 89
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ate exposure to domestic violence as a form of maltreatment.'37 In
other jurisdictions, courts have construed exposure to domestic
violence as a form of neglect. 3 ' In these circumstances, mothers
who are themselves the victims of abuse may be characterized as
neglectful for "failing to protect" the child from direct abuse or
even from exposure to the mother's own abuse. 139 As a result, the
victims of domestic abuse can be legally blamed for the harmful
effect of that abuse on their children.'4 ° In the words of one com-
mentator, "the dangerous confluence of two powerful arche-
types-being a mother and being battered-inflicts double injury
on women who wear both mantles. They not only bear the scars of
their abuser, but they also shoulder the blame for the harms oth-
ers cause to their children.""'
Exposure to domestic violence may, indeed, have serious ad-
verse effects on children, and those adverse effects may warrant
removal of the child from the home.' Treating a non-abusing
(1999); Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to
Protect Their Children from Their Male Partner's Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 67
(1995); Jill A. Phillips, Comment, Re-Victimized Battered Women: Termination of Parental
Rights for Failure to Protect Children from Child Abuse, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1549 (1992);
Melissa A. Trepiccione, At the Crossroads of Law and Social Science: Is Charging a Bat-
tered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child an Acceptable Solution When Her Child
Witnesses Domestic Violence?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2001); The "Failure to Protect"
Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to Protect": Still Blaming the
Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2000).
137. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-106b (West 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
620.023(1)(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); see also Weithorn, supra note 136, at 95-96.
138. See Weithorn, supra note 136, at 24; see also The "Failure to Protect" Working
Group, supra note 136, at 851 (explaining the legal basis for finding battered mothers
guilty of neglect).
139. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect
Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 229 (1996).
Across the nation, the misapplication of the "failure to protect" doctrine is
causing nonabusive battered mothers to lose custody of their children. Under
the "failure to protect" doctrine, courts deem guardians who fail to protect
their wards from unreasonable harm to be unfit. Consequently, the court re-
moves a child who has been abused by a father figure not only from the cus-
tody of the abuser, but from the care of the mother as well.
Id.
140. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 136, at 849. ("Charging
battered mothers with 'failure to protect' implies that they are neglecting their children,
because they did not prevent the violence. It places blame upon the mother, the primary
target of the violence, for the actions of the abuser.") (footnote omitted).
141. Justine A. Dunlap, The "Pitiless Double Abuse" of Battered Mothers, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 523, 523 (2003).
142. See Weithorn, supra note 136, at 4-6.
In the past two decades, researchers have amassed an impressive body of
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mother as morally culpable, however, may overlook the compli-
cated dynamics of domestic violence. As one commentator stated:
Battered women are beaten, threatened, and coerced. They live in
constant terror and chaos. Their efforts to escape a violent and fear-
filled relationship are met with rage and increased violence. Most
women are isolated from friends and family and have received little
if any assistance from protection agencies such as the police or the
Department of Social Services. These factors dramatically affect bat-
tered mothers' ability to resist the controlling and coercive behavior
of their abusers successfully. Consequently, the repeated attempts
by battered women to gain safety often fail, resulting in increased
danger to themselves and their children.
143
Abused mothers, in fact, may have few viable means of protecting
themselves and their children. While reporting the abuse to au-
thorities may seem an obvious remedy, statutes that mandate so-
cial services or law enforcement personnel to file reports with
child welfare authorities may deter abused mothers from report-
ing their abuse to such personnel.4 Abusers may use this fear of
empirical data demonstrating the negative impact of exposure to domestic
violence upon children's psychological development and functioning. Exposed
children may develop a range of social, emotional, and academic problems, in-
cluding aggressive conduct, anxiety symptoms, emotional withdrawal, and
serious difficulties in school. Research also suggests that these children are
more likely than are children from nonviolent homes to develop emotional
and adjustment problems as adults, including repetition of the patterns of
violence they observed as children. The data clearly demonstrate that grow-
ing up in violent homes is detrimental to children, even when children are not
direct victims of physical or sexual abuse. Researchers have observed, in fact,
that samples of children exposed to domestic violence display symptoms and
difficulties quite similar to children who have been direct victims of physical
abuse.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Amy Haddix, Comment, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging
the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children Through Statutory Termination of Parental
Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV. 757, 788 (1996).
[Riecent psychological studies indicate that domestic violence committed
against a mother has a profound effect on the children who witness it. Chil-
dren who live in an environment of domestic violence are very likely to suffer
emotional and physical abuse. Empirical studies indicate that children of all
ages who witness domestic violence exhibit aggravated behavioral problems.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
143. Enos, supra note 139, at 231.
144. The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 136, at 857-58; see Enos, su-
pra note 139, at 250-51.
[The] policy of removing children from battered mothers can be inter-
preted to mean that any time a battered mother goes to a social worker, talks
to her children's teacher, goes to her doctor or calls the police to report do-
mestic violence, she may be placing the custody of her children in jeopardy.
The chilling effect of charging battered mothers with failing to protect
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the removal of their children to deter women from reporting
abuse.145
Leaving home, and thus escaping the abuser, may similarly
seem an obvious remedy for abused women. Again, however, such
a remedy may be illusory. Attempts to leave the home may lead
the abuser to threats of violence against the woman or her chil-
dren or, worse yet, an actual increase in violence.146 Moreover,
abused women may simply lack the independent financial re-
sources to leave.
147
This phenomenon-battered women losing custody of their
children because of their status as victims of domestic violence-
was the focus of an exhaustive opinion issued by United States
District Court Judge Jack Weinstein in Nicholson v. Williams."4
Nicholson involved a class action against the City of New York
and its Administration for Children Services ("ACS") "brought on
behalf of abused mothers and their children who are separated
from each other because the mother has suffered domestic abuse
and the children are for this reason deemed neglected by the
mother." 49 The opinion describes instance after instance in which
ACS unreasonably and unfairly removed children from the cus-
tody of their battered mothers, evidencing, in the words of Judge
Weinstein, "widespread and unnecessary cruelty by agencies of
the City of New York towards mothers abused by their consorts,
through forced unnecessary separation of the mothers from their
children on the excuse that this sundering is necessary to protect
their children is that they will be even more reluctant to reach out to law en-
forcement, social services and the courts for the help they need. Knowing that
they may be investigated by child protective services, charged with neglect or
lose their children to foster care, battered mothers, isolated and afraid, are
more likely to remain in an abusive home so that they can remain with their
children.
The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 136, at 857-58.
145. Weithorn, supra note 136, at 126.
146. See Enos, supra note 139, at 243.
147. See id. at 246; see also The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 136, at
859.
148. 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The challenged actions in Nicholson involved
initial removal of children from their parents rather than termination of parental rights.
See id. at 254. Removal from parental custody is often a prequel to termination and the
concerns expressed by Judge Weinstein are equally relevant to the termination context.
For commentary on Nicholson, see generally Dunlap, supra note 141.
149. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 163-64.
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the children.""15 The judge captured the plight of the battered
mother in these words:
The mother may lack the ability or resources to either protect herself
or the children. Economic, emotional, moral or other ties may, as a
practical matter, prevent the mother from separating from the
abuser or seeking governmental protection against him. She may
hope for eventual reconciliation-and sometimes it does occur. Myr-
iad subtle reasons may prevent her from separating from the abuser,
protecting the children, or seeking assistance. In some households
ethnic or social mores are relied upon to justify abuse as a "tradi-
tional right." Ability to deal with tensions induced by self, a partner,
children, and economic and social factors varies enormously among
those who become embroiled in domestic violence.1 5 1
Termination of parental rights may also result from circum-
stances in which the parent is arguably more blameworthy, such
as drug or alcohol dependency152 or incarceration,1 53 but that
might be ameliorated, given time and resources. The paucity of
resources available may result in the termination of parental
rights of parents who, given more time and assistance, could have
developed into viable parents. 54 Recent federal legislation may
150. Id. at 163.
151. Id. at 164.
152. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 2, at § 4.04(1)(a)(vii); see, e.g., In re Brandon
00, 757 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y. App. Div 2003); In re Precious W., 776 N.E.2d 794 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002); In re Kristina D., 721 A.2d 1256 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
153. See ROBERTS, supra note 76, at 211. ("Some courts have ruled that a lengthy jail
term is enough to permanently sever the bond between imprisoned parents and their chil-
dren. Incarceration itself constitutes statutory grounds for termination of parental rights
in some states."); see also Mariely Downey, Losing More Than Time: Incarcerated Mothers
and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 41 (2001).
ASFA has had grave implications for incarcerated mothers. Because of the
forced separation between a mother and her child when she is incarcerated,
there is a greater risk for the possibility of termination of parental rights on
the basis of abandonment or permanent neglect. Under ASFA, the expedited
timetable for filing for termination based on the length of time a child has
been in foster care is especially problematic. Women who are incarcerated on
even relatively minor charges are now at risk for forfeiting their motherhood
under ASFA.
Id. at 45 (footnotes omitted). For a general overview of how states approach the termina-
tion of parental rights for incarcerated parents, see Steven Fleischer, Note, Termination of
Parental Rights: An Additional Sentence for Incarcerated Parents, 29 SETON HALL L. REV.
312 (1998).
154. See Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 775-76 (2001) ("[Once the state coercively removes children from
their families, it all too frequently fails to provide meaningful and sufficient services to
support or reunify the families. On the contrary, the unavailability of needed services and
inappropriateness of some provided services are well-established.") (footnotes omitted).
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exacerbate the inability of troubled parents to salvage their pa-
rental relationship. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
("ASFA"),155 aimed at reducing the number of children languish-
ing in long-term foster care, imposes time constraints that act to
accelerate the process of termination of parental rights. 156 Most
notably, ASFA requires that the state file a petition to terminate
parental rights if the child has been in foster care for fifteen of
the most recent twenty-two months. 57 The statutes of every state
have been amended to comply with the mandates of ASFA. 5 As a
consequence of ASFA, the "law creates an implicit presumption
that a parent who allows a child to linger in foster care for fifteen
months is unfit."15 9 A cure to problems such as substance abuse,
incarceration, or domestic violence may well be impossible within
a fifteen-month time frame. 60 There may, for instance, be long
waiting periods for admittance to substance abuse treatment pro-
155. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2000); Brown, supra note 14, at 128-31 (providing a brief
overview of the effect of federal legislation, including ASFA, on the termination of parental
rights process (providing a more extensive analysis of ASFA); see also Libby S. Adler, The
Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2001); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The
Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637
(1999); Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales from the Age of AFSA, 36 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 129 (2001).
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000). The filing requirement, however, is subject to
several statutory exceptions:
The state will not be required to file a petition to terminate parental rights if
(i) at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative;
(ii) a State agency has documented in the case plan .. .a compelling
reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the
best interests of the child; or
(iii) the State has not provided to the family of the child, consistent
with the time period in the State case plan, such services as the State
deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home, if
reasonable efforts of the type described in section 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) of
the title are required to be made with respect to the child.
Id. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii).
158. Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and
Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 176,
198 (2004).
159. Id. at 198. ASFA requires that a petition for termination be filed within the pre-
scribed time period. See Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Termination of Parental Rights:
Solving a Problem or Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament? 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 97, 100
(1999). It does not, however, require that parental rights in fact be terminated. Id. at 101.
160. See Ross, supra note 158, at 209.
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grams 16 ' and, once admitted, successful treatment may require
successive courses of treatment to break the cycle of addiction.162
2. The Under-Inclusiveness of Automatic Disinheritance
The disinheritance provisions of TPR statutes are not only
over-inclusive in the sense that they act to punish terminated
parents who are not in any meaningful sense deserving of pun-
ishment. They are also under-inclusive in that they do not affect
all abusive or neglectful parents equally, but rather impact cer-
tain parents disproportionately. Parents charged with maltreat-
ment of their children are disproportionately poor, disproportion-
ately minorities 63 (despite the fact that "there is no correlation
between race and rates of child maltreatment")," and dispropor-
tionately mothers. 6 '
Families that are enmeshed in the child welfare system are
disproportionately poor. 1 6 In Professor Robert's striking words,
"[poverty-not the type or severity of maltreatment-is the sin-
gle most important predictor of placement in foster care and the
amount of time spent there."'67 The high correlation between pov-
erty and child abuse is dramatically documented in the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services's Third National Inci-
dence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect, which found that
161. See id. at 211.
162. Id. at 212.
163. See Charlow, supra note 112, at 763. ("[Ploor children in the United States are
still being removed from their homes under child welfare laws. Because minorities are
disproportionately poor, their children are removed in disproportionate numbers despite
the fact that minority parents do not abuse or neglect more frequently than white par-
ents.") Id.
164. Appell, supra note 22, at 584 n.35.
165. See id. at 584.
The vast majority of children live with their mothers, whether in single
parent households, with their father as well as their mother, or with their
mother and her significant other. This necessarily means that where abuse or
neglect takes place, a mother's role is likely to be at issue, either as a perpe-
trator, for placing the child in harm's way, or for failure to protect the child
from another adult. Indeed, when we talk about child abuse and neglect we
are almost always talking, at some level, about mothers and their children,
even if the mother's partner is the abuser.
Ross, supra note 158, at 180 (footnote omitted).
166. See Appell, supra note 22, at 584.
167. ROBERTS, supra note 76, at 27.
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"family income was significantly related to incidence rates in
nearly every category of maltreatment."168
Why this correlation exists is less clear. It may result from
higher rates of reporting, due to the increased monitoring of fami-
lies receiving welfare or social services, rather than higher rates
of occurrence or maltreatment. 169 It may well be, however, that
there are real causal links between poverty and child maltreat-
ment. 7 ° Poor families suffer the "stress caused by economic hard-
ship," 71 including "[olvercrowded and dilapidated housing,"
7 2
"[ilnadequate food, clothing, and health care,"'73 and the "despair
that stems from stifled opportunities."74 Professor Appell vividly
captures the plight of the poor mother:
Poor mothers are more likely to live in high risk areas under high
stress related to the blight and violence which surrounds them and
under the strain of living on government benefits that are below sub-
sistence level. Some days, having the money or energy to do one
more thing, such as to take three buses to go shopping or to visit a
child, is just too much. When judged by someone who has a car or
car-fare and who does not have to spend much time worrying about
obtaining food, clean clothing, toiletries, or dodging bullets and crack
dealers, these mothers appear not to care enough about mother-
ing.
17 5
168. ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 10 (1996).
Compared to children whose families earned $30,000 per year or more, those
in families with annual incomes below $15,000 per year were . . . more than
22 times more likely to experience some form of maltreatment under the
Harm Standard and over 25 times more likely to suffer maltreatment of some
type using the Endangerment Standard ....
Id.
169. ROBERTS, supra note 76, at 32-33 ("[T]he heightened monitoring of poor families
results in the discovery of a great deal of child maltreatment-especially neglect-that
would have gone unnoticed had it occurred in the privacy afforded wealthier families.").




174. Id.; see also Charlow, supra note 112, at 776.
One may argue that the greater stress of poverty, the dangerous neighbor-
hoods in which poor people generally reside, and the lack of money for ade-
quate child care, food, medical care, and housing, all contribute to the likeli-
hood that a poor parent will not have the energy or time to properly care for
her children or will be more likely to lose her temper and inappropriately dis-
cipline her children.
Id.
175. Appell, supra note 22, at 586.
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Poverty is not the only characteristic that is typical of parents
charged with child maltreatment. Disproportionate numbers of
minority children, and thus minority parents, are enmeshed in
the child welfare system, despite the fact that child maltreatment
rates are not higher in minority families. 76 Of the 542,000 chil-
dren in the foster care system in September of 2001, 38% were
classified as black non-Hispanic, 17% as Hispanic, and only 37%
as white non-Hispanic. 177 In contrast, only 12.3% of the U.S.
population is black or African-American, 12.5% is Hispanic or La-
tino, and 75.1% is white.17 While the families subject to the child
welfare system are predominately minority, the decision makers
who operate the child welfare system-caseworkers, attorneys,
and judges-are predominately white.1 79
This over-representation of minority families in the child wel-
fare system may simply be a result of the correlation between
race and poverty.18° On the other hand, the over-representation of
minority children in the child welfare system may not simply be a
result of the link between poverty and race, but rather may re-
flect racial bias in the system.'"" Professor Roberts argues that
"even without definitive proof of racial bias on the part of [child
welfare workers and judges], it is accurate to say that the over-
representation of Black children in the child welfare system re-
sults from racism."8 2 Professor Roberts notes that black families
are subject to "racial bias in the initial reporting of maltreat-
ment,"183 and that "race affects the decision to separate reported
parents from their children. " "s Similarly, Professor Appell argues
176. See Charlow, supra note 112, at 771; Appell, supra note 22, at 584 & n.35.
177. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE AFCARS REPORT 2 (2003)
(providing preliminary estimates of fiscal year 2001 as of March 2003), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report8.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2005).
178. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: OVERVIEW
OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 3 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001
pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
179. Appell, supra note 22, at 585.
180. See Charlow, supra note 112, at 775 ("[A] number of studies appear to support the
theory that the cause of the minority over-representation in the system is the dispropor-
tionate number of poor minorities. In other words, neglect is related to poverty, not minor-
ity status.").
181. See ROBERTS, supra note 76, at 47.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 49.
184. Id. at 51.
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that "[alithough definitive proof of race and class bias may have
eluded empirical researchers, evidence suggests that indicators of
poverty may be confused with indicators of potential child abuse
or neglect, and that risk-assessors are unconsciously biased to see
minority and socioeconomically disadvantaged families as patho-
logical."" 5 Some commentators have argued that it is judges' pre-
conceived definitions of "good" mothers that lead to the termina-
tion of parental rights, even in the absence of harm to the child,
8 6
and that women of color are more likely to be perceived as bad
mothers. 187
These parents, often poor, minority women, may be unrepre-
sented by counsel in their confrontation with the power of the
state. 8 8 And the unequal nature of the parent's confrontation
with the state has been powerfully characterized by the Supreme
Court of the United States as follows:
The State's ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs
the parents' ability to mount a defense. No predetermined limits re-
strict the sums an agency may spend in prosecuting a given termina-
tion proceeding. The State's attorney usually will be expert on the is-
sues contested and the procedures employed at the factfinding
hearing, and enjoys full access to all public records concerning the
family. The State may call on experts in family relations, psychology,
and medicine to bolster its case. Furthermore, the primary witnesses
at the hearing will be the agency's own professional caseworkers
whom the State has empowered both to investigate the family situa-
tion and to testify against the parents. Indeed, because the child is
already in agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the
historical events that form the basis for termination.1
8 9
V. EXTINGUISHING THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF PARENTAL KIN
When termination of parental rights does extinguish the in-
heritance rights of the parent, we face a further question-does
the termination order bar only inheritance by the terminated
185. Appell, supra note 154, at 773 (footnotes omitted).
186. See Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Pa-
rental Rights, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 61, 67 (1995).
187. See id. at 69.
188. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 865-66 (2d ed. 1988).
189. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
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parent, or is the effect broader, extinguishing the inheritance
rights of the parent's kin as well? The statutes themselves pro-
vide little guidance. Type B statutes (which explicitly extinguish
the inheritance rights of parents) 9 ° generally say nothing at all
about the right of parental kin to inherit from the child through
the terminated parent. Those very few Type B statutes that do
explicitly address the inheritance rights of parental kin vary
dramatically. The Virginia statute affects inheritance rights very
narrowly, extinguishing the right of the terminated parent to in-
herit, but providing that the "order shall not otherwise affect the
rights of the child, the child's kindred, or the parent's kindred to
take from or through the parent or the rights of the parent's kin-
dred to take from or through the child."191 In contrast, the Dela-
ware statute extinguishes inheritance rights very broadly, provid-
ing that "the child shall lose all rights of inheritance from the
parents whose parental rights were terminated and from their
collateral or lineal relatives and the parents whose parental
rights were terminated and their collateral or lineal relatives
shall lose all rights of inheritance from the child."192
Type C statutes do not explicitly address the inheritance rights
of parents and as a consequence, say nothing about the inheri-
tance rights of parental kin.'93 Similarly, Type D statutes, which
make no explicit mention of inheritance rights at all, say nothing
about the inheritance rights of parental kin.' 94
In most jurisdictions, then, the language of the statutes does
not help us determine whether extinguishing the inheritance
rights of the terminated parents also extinguishes the rights of
parental kin to inherit. We could read the statutes as cutting off
the inheritance rights not only of the parent, but of the parent's
kin as well. In other words, not only is the parent barred from in-
heriting from the child, but all other parental family members
(e.g., grandparents, aunts and uncles and cousins, etc.) are barred
190. See supra Part II for a description of Type B, C, and D statutes and identification
of examples of each type. Type A statutes, which explicitly retain the inheritance rights of
both parent and child after termination (at least until the child's subsequent adoption) are
not discussed in this part of the article, as the clear intent of such statutes is to leave in-
heritance rights unaffected by the termination order.
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(5) (2002) (emphasis added).
192. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1113(b) (1999 & Cum. Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
193. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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as well. The Supreme Court of Washington, in a recent decision,
reached just that conclusion. In In re Estate of Fleming,"' the pa-
rental rights of the decedent's mother had been terminated when
the decedent was an infant in order to free the decedent for adop-
tion.'96 The decedent, however, was never adopted.' 97 When the
decedent died intestate as an adult, he was unmarried and child-
less.198 He was, however, survived by his terminated biological
mother and half-brother, another son of his biological mother.' 9
The court held that "[w]hile the order could not change [the bio-
logical mother's] status as the biological parent of [the child], it
did end her legal status as his parent." 200 And, the court contin-
ued, as the terminated mother was no longer the child's legal
mother, she did not fall within the meaning of "parent" in the
state intestate succession statute, °1 and thus was not entitled to
inherit from the child.2" 2 Getting to the issue with which we are
immediately concerned, the court went on to hold that the dece-
dent's half brother was similarly barred from inheriting from his
sibling.2"3 The court, relying on the language in the intestate suc-
cession statute that "those issue of the parent" who survive may
inherit, held:
195. 21 P.3d 281 (Wash. 2001).
196. Id. at 283. The mother's parental rights were terminated in 1947 under Rem. Rev.
Stat. § 1700, which authorized the surrender of children to charitable organizations for the
purpose of making the child available for adoption. Id. The statute provided that when a
child was surrendered to a charitable organization, "'the rights of its natural parents or of
the guardian of its person (if any) shall cease.'" Id. at 283-84. The court order approving
the mother's voluntary termination of her parental rights stated that she was "'perma-
nently deprived of any and all maternal rights and interests in and to the said Baby Boy
Fleming.'" Id. at 284.
197. Id. at 283.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 284 (emphasis in original).
201. Id. at 284-85. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.04.015(2) (West 1998), which reads
in relevant part:
(2) Shares of others than surviving spouse. The shares of the net estate not
distributable to the surviving spouse, or the entire net estate if there is no
surviving spouse, shall descend and be distributed as follows:
(a) To the issue of the intestate ....
(b) If the intestate not be survived by issue, then to the parent or par-
ents who survive the intestate.
(c) If the intestate not be survived by issue or by either parent, then to
those issue of the parent or parents who survive the intestate ....
202. In re Estate of Fleming, 21 P.3d at 286.
203. See id.
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The right of a sibling to inherit from a deceased sibling is based upon
the person's status as the issue of a common parent; there is no di-
rect distribution to a person based upon his or her status as a sibling
of the deceased. The common parent provides the link through which
the estate passes.
2 04
Thus, the half-brother of the decedent was barred from inheri-
tance and, in the absence of any other heirs, the estate escheated
to the state.0 5
The court's analysis of the issue is troublesome. Citing its ear-
lier Donnelly2°s decision, the Fleming court relied on a single pol-
icy goal: "In order to give a child a fresh start, all interests and
rights between the biological parent and child are severed when
that relationship is terminated."2 ' That rationale, however,
seems inapt. Donnelly, which persuasively articulated the "fresh
start" policy, was an adoption case, not a termination of parental
rights case.20 8 The Fleming court viewed that distinction as ir-
relevant, concluding:
The legislative policy identified in Donnelly applies to the entire
adoption process, including the termination of the biological parent-
child relationship. The adopted child must be given a "fresh start."
The legislative policy provided that all ties be severed at this point,
not at the time the child is placed into the adoptive family. In fact,
the Legislature indicated so in RCW 26.33.130(2), stating: "[an or-
der terminating the parent-child relationship divests the parent and
the child of all legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties,
and obligations with respect to each other." Given this, it stands to
reason our holding in Donnelly applies not only to cases where an
adoption has occurred but also to cases in which the parent-child re-
lationship has been permanently severed in anticipation of an adop-
tion.
20 9
The Washington court's approach is unpersuasive. Ideally,
termination of parental rights will result in adoption. But often,
as was the case in Fleming, it does not. When termination does
not lead to adoption, there is no family into which the child can be
integrated. If the notion of "fresh start" is to have any meaning, it
must mean a fresh start in a new, replacement family. When the
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163 (Wash. 1972).
207. In re Estate of Fleming, 21 P.3d at 286.
208. See In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d at 1164.
209. In re Estate of Fleming, 21 P.3d at 285 (alteration in original).
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Donnelly court spoke of a "fresh start," it referred to "giving the
adopted child a 'fresh start' by treating him as the natural child
of the adoptive parent, and severing all ties with the past. 21 ° The
value of granting a fresh start seems dependent on there being a
new, adoptive family in which the child will start afresh. There
can be no "fresh start," in the sense articulated in Donnelly, until
and unless the child is adopted into a new family.
How, then, should we treat the inheritance rights of kin of ter-
minated parents? Most statutes simply do not tell us whether ex-
tinguishing the inheritance rights of terminated parents has the
additional effect of barring inheritance by parental kin as well.211
Assuming, as the Supreme Court of Washington did in Fleming,
that inheritance by other family members through the termi-
nated parent is automatically barred seems unnecessarily draco-
nian. There is no reason to assume that parental kin are unwor-
thy heirs. It is hard to imagine a policy rationale for disinheriting
family members, particularly siblings, who are in no way respon-
sible for the inadequate parenting that led to the termination. So
how should we treat the inheritance rights of kin of terminated
parents?
The slayer statutes provide an alternative model.212 Slayer
statutes, like TPR statutes, bar inheritance by potential heirs be-
cause they are "unworthy" to inherit.1 3 As with TPR statutes, the
slayer statutes must address the question of the scope of the in-
heritance bar: Is the unworthy heir, the slayer, alone barred, or
does the bar extend to all who would inherit through the unwor-
thy? Many slayer statutes provide that the disqualified slayer
will be treated as if he or she predeceased the victim, 214 which
means that the slayer alone is barred, while other relatives of the
slayer may still inherit through the slayer. Such an approach
would avoid the unhappy result reached in Fleming. If only one
parent is terminated, the unterminated parent, who likely bore
the burden of raising the child, will generally inherit the entire
estate, assuming that the decedent left no surviving spouse or
210. In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d at 1136.
211. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
212. See supra Section III.A.
213. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-253(a) (1991 & Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
732.802(1) (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-5(b) (1997); see also Sherman, supra note
19, at 851.
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children.215 If, as in Fleming, there are no surviving, untermi-
nated parents (and, again assuming no surviving spouse or chil-
dren), the estate will go to parental kin with surviving siblings
generally being the first takers.216 Such a result seems likelier to
replicate the intent of such decedents than does the escheat to the
state that occurred in Fleming.
VI. PROPOSAL
Most current TPR statutes explicitly or implicitly bar inheri-
tance by parents after termination. Type B statutes expressly ex-
tinguish the right of the terminated parent to inherit.217 Type C
statutes do not expressly address the inheritance rights of par-
ents, but likely extinguish those rights implicitly.28 And the very
broad language used in Type D statutes to describe the effect of
the termination order suggests that Type D statutes as well are
likely to be interpreted as extinguishing the inheritance rights of
terminated parents.9
Automatic disinheritance of terminated parents is troubling.
While some terminated parents have acted reprehensibly and
thus seem deserving of "punishment," or at least undeserving of
benefits flowing from their status as parents, TPR statutes that
disinherit terminated parents do so in blanket fashion. No parent
whose parental rights have been terminated may inherit from his
or her biological child, regardless of the reason for the termina-
tion. In this respect, the statutes operate too broadly. Parental
rights are terminated not only because parents have been abu-
sive, but also because parents are incapable of adequate parent-
ing. That lack of capacity may result from mental or physical
handicaps or abuse, which are far beyond the control of the par-
ent and thus undeserving of moral censure or punishment. Simi-
larly, in disinheriting automatically, the TPR statutes operate
unfairly, disproportionately affecting the inheritance rights of
poor, minority mothers.
215. See supra note 104.
216. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 78-80.
217. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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Those termination statutes, however, that explicitly, and thus
automatically, preserve the right of parents to inherit after ter-
mination of parental rights (Type A statutes) also miss the mark.
While not all terminated parents are truly unworthy heirs, some
clearly are. Just as it seems unjust to disinherit parents whose
parental rights are terminated because of their mental or psycho-
logical impairments, it seems unjust to allow parents whose
rights have been terminated because of the parents' physical or
sexual abuse of their children to benefit from their relationship
with the children that they have treated reprehensibly. While it
is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to accurately estimate the
presumed testamentary intention of children of terminated par-
ents,22° in the case of seriously abusive parents, it does not seem
inappropriate to substitute our societal judgment that such par-
ents should not inherit from the child when the child dies before
reaching the age of legal capacity to execute a will.
Virtually all current TPR statutes, then, because they either
terminate the inheritance rights of all terminated parents or pre-
serve the inheritance rights of all terminated parents, deal in-
adequately with the issue of post-termination inheritance rights.
State statutes should be amended to remove provisions that ei-
ther automatically extinguish or automatically preserve the in-
heritance rights of the terminated parent and to include instead a
provision authorizing the court issuing the final termination or-
der to terminate the inheritance rights of the parent. In deciding
whether to extinguish parental inheritance rights, the statute
should direct the court to consider several factors.
First, the court should consider whether the parental behavior
that precipitated termination is of a nature that warrants disin-
heritance. Physical or sexual abuse of the child would be prime
examples of behavior warranting disinheritance, while inability
to parent adequately due to the parent's mental deficiencies
would not warrant disinheritance. While many termination cases
will be far less clear-cut than these examples, judicial discretion
should result in fewer clearly inappropriate results than the cur-
rent automatic mechanisms.
Second, as a minor child is unable to execute a will and thus ef-
fectuate her own plan of testamentary property disposition, the
220. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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court should consider whether the relationship between the par-
ent and the child suggests that the child would prefer disinherit-
ing or not disinheriting the parent. Again, this factor may be dif-
ficult for a court to apply. But, again, the court, having heard
evidence concerning the effect of the parent's behavior on the
child in conjunction with the termination of parental rights pro-
ceedings, is in a position to make a more informed assessment
than is possible under statutes that allow for no individualized
assessment of the individual child's probable intent.
Third, the court should consider whether disinheriting the par-
ent whose parental rights have been terminated would likely lead
to a more equitable property disposition than would preserving
the parent's inheritance rights. For instance, if a mother is likely
to bear all of the costs of raising a child after the termination of
the father's parental rights, extinguishing the inheritance rights
of the father may be appropriate.
Similarly, there seems no good reason to automatically bar in-
heritance by kin of the terminated parent, as some statutes do.
The better approach would be to follow the example set by many
slayer statutes and treat a parent whose inheritance rights have
been extinguished as if the parent predeceased the child.
VII. CONCLUSION
Existing TPR statutes deal poorly with the post-termination
inheritance rights of terminated parents. It might be appropriate
to extinguish the inheritance rights of a terminated parent if, as a
consequence, a greater share of the child's estate will pass to oth-
ers (such as a non-terminated parent or other relatives) who bore
the expense and responsibility of rearing the child. By mandating
automatic extinguishing of inheritance rights, however, existing
statutes allow for no such assessment and give no consideration
to where the estate will go and to the fairness of that disposition.
It may be appropriate to extinguish the inheritance rights of par-
ents who abuse or intentionally neglect their child-those parents
whose conduct is so reprehensible that society cannot fairly allow
them to benefit from their parental status. Again, however, exist-
ing statutes disinherit parents far too broadly. It is apparent that
parental rights frequently are terminated for reasons such as pa-
rental mental illness or mental retardation that do not war-
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rant punishment. It also seems likely that the punitive effect
of barring inheritance rights falls disproportionately on poor,
minority mothers. TPR statutes that effect a blanket disinheri-
tance of all terminated parents, those who lack the ability or re-
sources to parent effectively, as well as those who are abusive or
intentionally neglectful, then, would seem to paint with far too
broad a brush. TPR statutes should be amended to provide for
discretionary, rather than mandatory, disinheritance of termi-
nated parents.

